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REVIEWS
LEGAL THINKING REVISED. By A. Vilhelm Lundstedt. Stock-

holm: Almqvist and Wiksell. 1956. Pp. 420.
What are the right mental processes by which issues of law are
to be determined? This question of the "right" legal method has
prominently occupied the minds of legal thinkers, especially of the
earlier decades of the twentieth century. Mental processes which
had been applied during the nineteenth century and had come to be
regarded as being self-evident and as the only possible ones, came
to be questioned and attacked, and different approaches came to be
advocated as more appropriate for the solution of the legal problems of the new century. The country in which the methodological
question was raised earliest was Germany, where the traditional
method of the nineteenth century Pandectists was attacked in the
1860s by von Buelow and somewhat later, more violently and with
greater efficacy, by von Jhering. Around the turn of the century
the question de la mfthode was raised in France by G~ny, Saleilles
and Duguit. In the new century, the Methodenstreit was continued
in Italy by Ferri and, with particular vigor, in Germany by the advocates of so-called Free Law and their less radical brethren of the
school of jurisprudence of interests. Here in the United States, the
critique of the traditional methods of judicial thought was initiated
by Roscoe Pound's postulate of a sociological jurisprudence, exemplified by the creative activities of great judges such as Brandeis, Cardozo and Holmes, and radicalized by the realists such as
Jerome Frank, or Thurman Arnold. A group of methodological innovators to whom the same name of realists also came to be applied,
arose in the Scandinavian countries. Their battles with the traditionalists in their part of the world was no less heated than the
battle that was fought in this country in the 1920s and 1930s.
In Scandinavia the realist movement was started by Axel
Haegerstroem, professor at the University of Uppsala, not of law
but of history and philosophy. Historical investigation had made
him aware of the connection which had existed in very early Rome
between legal thinking and magical ideas. From this observation
he drew the conclusion that in our times, too, such notions as
justice, right, or guilt had no existence other than in the realm of
superstition, that they were basic for all thinking in modern law,
and that no scientifically valid system of legal thought would be
possible until we disabused ourselves of these archaic ideas and all
conclusions derived from them, and began "realistically" to develop
an entirely new set of legal norms being solely guided by the desire
to achieve the highest possible state of public welfare. Haegerstroem's discoveries were enthusiastically received by his disciple
Lundstedt, who, as professor of law at Uppsala, devoted his life to
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the propagation and elaboration of the new "scientific" method of
legal realism by which, he hoped, our obsolete structure of society
could be transformed into that better society which social science
would rationally elaborate by using methods of the same kind as
those by which science had brought about the great achievements
of modern medicine and technology. With the conviction of the
prophet to whom after millenia of darkness the truth has at long
last been revealed, Lundstedt regarded it as his task to bring the
light not only to Scandinavians but to all who have lived in darkness. He thus presented his ideas not only in his native Swedish
but also in books written in languages of larger linguistic communities. French and German versions of Lundstedt's thought were
published during his lifetime. The English version was completed
by him shortly before he died on August 20, 1955. Its final publication was faithfully carried through by the Faculty of Law of the
University of Uppsala. The title of the handsomely printed book,
Legal Thinking Revised. My Views on Law, aptly indicates that it
constitutes the final, and most mature, version of a scholar whose
influence on Scandinavian legal thinking has been enormous, but
whose ambition it was to bring about the total revision of legal
thinking not only in Scandinavia but everywhere, and quite particularly in the English speaking countries whose methods of legal
thought he found to be as obsolete as those of the countries of the
civil law.
The book is passionately written. The English is not that of an
author to whom it is his own tongue, but it reads well and is apt
to convey to English speaking readers the train of the author's
thought and argument, although not in all detail. Certain technical
terms of the civil law are rendered by English terms which are
either misleading or devoid of meaning. What American reader
will know, for instance, that "vindication right" is meant to refer
to the right of action of the owner of a chattel or immovable who
finds himself deprived of its possession and who seeks to recover
not just money damages but the possession itself, so that the term
refers to the civil law counterpart of the common law actions of
ejectment and replevin? Only a reader familiar with the German
term "materielles Recht" will know that "material law" is to refer
to that notion which in English is commonly expressed by the term
"substantive law" as contrasted with "procedural law." "Hire of
a thing" should be bailment or lease, "judicature" should be case
law, and "law of damages" should be law of torts. The full understanding of Lundstedt's argument is thus not easy.
How significant is this argument itself ? What does Lundstedt
have to tell the American readers whom he so eagerly sought to
reach? That he has a message, there can be no doubt. But the same
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message has been stated by other thinkers, American, and European, and by quite a few of them it has been stated more clearly
and more effectively. Lundstedt's message is in its essence no different from that of those other attackers of nineteenth century
methods of legal thought who have been mentioned above. Their
attack and that of Lundstedt are directed against the same target,
i.e., that method of legal thought which has come to be called "conceptual jurisprudence." That new method which Lundstedt wishes
to set into its place is the same as that which was once advocated
by the German adepts of Free Law and the most radical of the
American realists. Like these fellow warriors, Lundstedt has a
point, but he overstates it, both in his critique of traditional legal
thought and in his positive proposals.
Insofar as traditional legal thought has been bent at deriving
solutions to controversies of actual life solely from those concepts
which have come to be used in legal thinking, criticism has been
justified and come to be accepted. If a court or a legislature is to
decide whether or not the benefit of limited liability shall be available to a person who owns the entire stock of a business corporation, we all agree that the answer ought to be found upon the basis
of such considerations as those by which we try to ascertain what
dangers, if any, are involved in such a situation for members of
society engaging in transactions with the "one-man corporation"
and whether such dangers overbalance the benefit which the economy may derive from the use of the device of limited liability by
a single enterpriser. Few lawyers will find it satisfactory to answer the problem by simply concluding that by definition the concept of corporation means a plurality of members and that a oneman corporation is thus conceptionally impossible. We have come
to be equally dissatisfied with that line of thought which maintained that by logical necessity a contract cannot be "governed" by
any law other than that of the place at which there occurred the
last act necessary to render it binding. Here in the United States,
as well as abroad, we have come to approach this problem of the
law of conflict of laws by considering which answer serves best the
social interests at stake, such as the expectations of the parties or
the governmental interests of the states in question. Old-style conceptual jurisprudence in the sense just exemplified is not entirely
dead, but it has come widely to be replaced by that new method
which has been defined by the German writers on the jurisprudence
of interests,' in the more recent writings of Karl Llewellyn,2 or in
Scandinavia by Frede Castberg.3 This "new jurisprudence" 4 does,
'The
Jurisprudence of Interests (Schoch ed. 1948).
2
Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the New Jurisprudence (1940).
8Castberg,
Problems of Legal Philosophy (1957).
4
See also J. Esser, Prinzip und Rechtsnorm (1956).
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of course, not dispense with using concepts or logic; otherwise it
could not be an application of reason. But it seeks to replace outmoded concepts of a purely formalistic nature by concepts which
express the interests which are at stake in a given conflict and the
evaluations by which a given society tries to achieve their balance
at a given time. At present, we are thus no longer concerned with
the establishment of the new jurisprudence as such but rather with
its elaboration, refinement and application to concrete problems.
In this situation the publication of a book which still sounds the
original battle cry and which sounds it as shrilly and noisily as it
is done by the Swedish champion, constitutes an anachronism. Perhaps, the violence of the attacks of Lundstedt, Fuchs, Frank or
Arnold was necessary to shake the fortress of the "old jurisprudence." But today we can also see that Lundstedt widely overshot
his mark both in his critique of the traditional methods of legal
thought and in his design of a new method. His description of the
traditional method is a caricature rather than a portrait. Lundstedt's untenable analysis of the method applied by those judges
who decided Rylands v. Fletcher5 constitutes a typical instance. As
to his proposed method of "scientifically" exploring what is best
for the common welfare, we, who have experienced two world wars,
the atom bomb and the cold war, can only admire, but no longer
share, the optimism of so many of the thinkers of Lundstedt's generation. We have come to learn that the complexities of modern
society rarely allow any clear prediction of the results of any social
measure, as well as that men can and do disagree as to what constitutes the social welfare. As a "self-evident assumption" of his
method of social welfare Lundstedt postulates that "legal activities," i.e., the activities of law makers, judges, attorneys, etc. "are
pursued by people of a sound mind and those who are not corrupted
by private interests." We can only envy a country in which one
can dare to make such an assumption. But even if the assumption
of general unselfishness of all the law people could be made, we can
no longer believe that the social scientists can lead us into the good
society. At best they can every now and then predict the proximate
results of some measure of social engineering, but they can never
tell us what kind of society mankind ought ultimately aim to
achieve. The ultimate good is a matter of individual decision but
not of scientific cognition.
Yet, when all these criticisms have been stated, Legal Thinking
Revised is a book very much worth reading. The book documents
an important phase in the modern struggle about the right method
of legal thought. To American readers it illustrates the universal5[18661 L.R. 1 Ex. 265, affd, [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
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ity of the situation in which we are finding ourselves. Lastly, and
most important, Anders Vilhelm Lundstedt was a powerful personality with a powerful mind. The book is replete with brilliant
ideas, striking formulations, and significant insights. Our thoughts
will be clarified by Lundstedt's analyses of liability without fault
or of eminent domain. His highly original ideas about English
viewpoints of jurisprudence, of Pound's view of legal matters, of
Fowler Harper's view of law, as well as his "concluding remarks on
American jurisprudence" make familiar problems appear in a new
light and will thus significantly help us in our present efforts to
consolidate the new jurisprudence.
MAX RHEINSTEINf

MVExIcO: A SYMPOSIUM OF LAW AND GOVERNMENT. University
of Miami School of Law, Interamerican Legal Studies. Coral
Gables: University of Miami Press. 1958. Pp. 125. $4.25.
The symposium submitted for review offers an abundant source
of information and suggested source material to those students of
Mexican law to whom that subject is novel. Of even greater importance, it also provides a delightful and invigorating refresher
course for those American and other non-Mexican lawyers who
have previously enjoyed the privilege of "doing business," engaging
in banking operations, or organizing and guiding corporate enterprises in Mexico or through Mexican associates.
Frankly, the work is good. Any criticism- if "criticism" be the
appropriate word - which might be directed at it would be in relation to its brevity, not its quality. Each contributor to the symposium could, with complete justification, have expanded his contribution into a "leading article" of the American law review type,
with footnotes. Understandably, however, in view of the all too
scanty space allocated to each author, unavoidable restrictions of
expression and reference to authorities have been imposed. Be that
as it may, the several authors have accomplished a masterful performance of summarization and condensation.
In the mind of the reviewer, who has benefited by modest experience in the practices and procedures of Mexican law, the greatest practical value of the symposium results from the fact that it
is the product of exclusively Mexican scholars and men of letters.
Collectively, the authors are representative of the Faculty of Law
of the National University of Mexico, the Mexican Bar, the Free
School of Law of Mexico, and of the practicing (duly licensed) lawyer-notaries (Notaries Public) of the Federal District of Mexico.
tMax Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago Law
School.

